Good morning, The district court issued a preliminary injunction in California v. U.S. DOT, enjoining the defendants from imposing the immigration enforcement conditions on the States that sued and their local governments. The decision is fairly short given the time frame (some of the grants required certification by today). Here is the order (again only as to the States and their governmental subdivisions): 1. Defendants are prohibited from implementing or enforcing the Immigration Enforcement Condition as set forth in the Duffy Directive. 2. Defendants are prohibited from withholding or terminating federal funding based on the Immigration Enforcement Condition as set forth in the Duffy Directive absent specific statutory authorization. 3. Defendants are prohibited from taking adverse action against any state entity or local jurisdiction, including barring it from receiving or making it ineligible for federal funding, based on the Immigration Enforcement Condition, absent specific statutory authorization. 4. The Court forbids and enjoins any attempt to implement the Immigration Enforcement Condition, and any actions by the Defendants to implement or enforce the Immigration Enforcement Condition. You can read the decision here: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.59601/gov.uscourts.rid.59601.57.0_1.pdf. Thanks, Amanda [logo]<https://imla.org/> [facebook icon]<https://www.facebook.com/InternationalMunicipalLawyersAssociation/>[twitter icon]<https://twitter.com/imlalegal>[linkedin icon]<https://www.linkedin.com/company/international-municipal-lawyers-association-inc./> Amanda Karras (she/her) Executive Director / General Counsel International Municipal Lawyers Association P: (202) 466-5424 x7116 D: (202) 742-1018 51 Monroe St. Suite 404 Rockville, MD, 20850 Plan Ahead! See IMLA's upcoming events<https://imla.org/events/>, calls and programming.

Good afternoon: A couple of other updates involving overlapping issues of federal funding / DEI and a few other updates in other cases: 1. Funding / DEI. The court in San Francisco Unified School District v. AmeriCorps granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on 6/18/25. In this case, the plaintiffs challenge AmeriCorps' imposition of grant conditions, including a condition that certain grant recipients certify that their programs "do[] not include any activities that promote DEI activities." (These conditions specifically did not contain references to the DEI being illegal or in violation of anti-discrimination laws as we've seen elsewhere. (The certification stated: "I certify that [Program Name], [Application ID] complies with all administration Executive Orders and does not include any activities that promote DEI activities.") The relevant Executive Orders are 14151, "Ending Radical And Wasteful Government DEI Programs And Preferencing," 14173, "Ending Illegal Discrimination And Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity", and Executive Order 14168, "Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government. " After first concluding that the plaintiffs had established irreparable harm and that the public interest and balance of hardships favored the plaintiffs, the court found that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their claims that the defendants violated the APA. The court highlighted Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in demonstrating that the AmeriCorps Directive and the new grant conditions are in excess of AmeriCorps' statutory authority because AmeriCorps does not have the authority to impose anti-DEI grant conditions that are antithetical to its statutory purposes of AmeriCorps, purposes which are infused with the stated goal of addressing economic, racial and other equities. Nor does AmeriCorps have statutory authority to ban what the governing statutes expressly permit and even encourages... AmeriCorps' enabling statutes demonstrate that Congress made principles of diversity, equity, and inclusion integral to AmeriCorps. Further, AmeriCorps' own rubric to review grant applications demonstrates the central importance of grantees' commitment to these principles. Specifically, when Plaintiffs were applying for their AmeriCorps funding, they were required to verify their "Commitment to Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility" ("DEIA"), which was given explicit weight in the review process. The court also found the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in their claims that the defendants violated the Spending Clause because the conditions are "insurmountably ambiguous" and they do not "relate sufficiently to AmeriCorps' purpose." The court notes the Executive orders do not define DEI or DEIA and during the hearing the defendants failed to provide a definition of the terms despite inquiries by the court. Finally, the court found the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in their claims that AmeriCorps' actions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. The court found that the plaintiffs did not have to post a bond. The court also denied the defendants' request for a stay. Here is a copy of the decision: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.446145/gov.uscourts.cand.446145.59.0.pdf 1. Funding. In Harris County v. Kennedy, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in some respects but denied it in others. This case had to do with the termination of $11 billion in public health funding, which HHS claimed it terminated "for cause" based on the pandemic being over. The court first concluded that it had jurisdiction over the constitutional claims, rejecting the defendant's Tucker Act arguments. The court emphasized that the thrust of the plaintiffs' arguments were separation of powers claims and the "mere presence of a contract in relation to a claim is not enough to deprive this a district court of jurisdiction over the claim." However, later in the decision, the court circles back to the Tucker Act / jurisdictional question and indicated that it was declining to address the plaintiffs' contrary-to-statute and contrary-to-regulation claims under the APA because A) they are duplicative of other claims; and B) they may be foreclosed by the Department of Education Supreme Court case. But then as to the APA arbitrary and capricious claims, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to show all likelihood that the court has jurisdiction over those claims under Department of Education. The court found the APA claims were on all fours with the Department of Education decision. Thus, the court distinguishes between APA and constitutional claims for the purposes of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to their separation of powers claims and ultra vires claims, but not the remaining APA claims. On the separation of powers claims, the court found that regarding funds appropriated under statutes whose funds are no longer available for obligation (CPRSAA, CARES Act, and CRRSAA), the defendants were essentially saying they will never spend the funds Congress appropriated (without invoking the Impoundment Act or other proper authority). Quoting then judge-Kavanaugh, the court explained "the President does not have unilateral authority to refuse to spend" funds that Congress has appropriated simply because of "policy reasons[.]" The court rejected the notion that the defendants' grants were terminating based on frustration of purpose - i.e., the pandemic being over. The court explained that Congress had rejected that position when it augmented municipal public-health spending separate from the COVID emergency. "A large bipartisan majority of Congress rescinded some pandemic-era funds but left the funds at issue here untouched, doubling down on Congress's view that spending to combat coronavirus in general should continue even after the pandemic ended." The court therefore concluded that the agency's refusal to spend these grant funds was a "quintessential policy choice by the Executive Branch", which could not be "squared the Congress' contrary legislative choices." The court also rejected the federal government's argument that it obligated sufficient funds and it had spent the minimum amount that Congress authorized for state and local governments. The court explained that it "would make a mockery of Congress's spending power if the Executive Branch could fulfill its constitutional and statutory duties through the sleight of hand of obligating funds and later de-obligating them." As far as its argument that it spent the minimum, the court points out that the statutes required a minimum and a top-line spend number and by only meeting the minimum, HHS failed to meet the separate requirement set forth in the statutes. This part is a bit technical, but basically HHS obligated more than the minimum, and once it did, the court said it had to spend that amount (subject to the top-line indicated by Congress). The court emphasized that this does not mean the Executive Branch has to spend every single penny of every appropriation Congress passes. But, the court noted, that is not what happened here. The ARPA and PPA funds are in a different category because they were "available until expended." Because they are open-ended, HHS can re-obligate any money freed up by the termination of plaintiffs' grants. In order to succeed on these claims then, the plaintiffs must show that Congress specified the manner in which the funds would be spent. The court found that nothing in any later appropriations, including the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 limited HHS' discretion on how to spend the appropriated funds for these statutes. Because Congress was silent as to these open-ended funds, the court concluded that Congress did not intend to further limit what HHS could do with the funds appropriated under ARPA and PPA. The court did note that Congress' decision to maintain appropriations under these Acts made it clear that Congress wanted the funds to be spent, but the Executive Branch can still fulfill its statutory mandate by reallocating the canceled grant money. Though it was skeptical of the defendants' interest in doing so, the court indicated that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the Executive Branch cannot or will not reallocate this grant money, and the plaintiffs therefore did not meet their burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits as to these claims. The court declined to impose a bond. The court also declined to issue a nationwide injunction based on the association's involvement (AFSCME). Here is a copy of the decision: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.279895/gov.uscourts.dcd.279895.33.0.pdf 1. Funding / Immigration / DEI. Briefing was set for the Ninth Circuit appeal of King County v. Turner. Appellant's briefs will be due 7/8 and King County / appellees' briefs will be due 8/5. 1. Funding / Immigration. Chicago amended its complaint in City of Chicago v. Department of Homeland Security regarding the freezing of Securing Cities counter terrorism funding. Boston, Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle were added as plaintiffs. Thanks, Amanda [logo]<https://imla.org/> [facebook icon]<https://www.facebook.com/InternationalMunicipalLawyersAssociation/>[twitter icon]<https://twitter.com/imlalegal>[linkedin icon]<https://www.linkedin.com/company/international-municipal-lawyers-association-inc./> Amanda Karras (she/her) Executive Director / General Counsel International Municipal Lawyers Association P: (202) 466-5424 x7116 D: (202) 742-1018 51 Monroe St. Suite 404 Rockville, MD, 20850 Plan Ahead! See IMLA's upcoming events<https://imla.org/events/>, calls and programming. From: Amanda Karras via Cityattorneys <cityattorneys@lists.imla.org> Sent: Friday, June 20, 2025 9:23 AM Subject: [Cityattorneys] IMLA Federal Funding / Immigration Update - California v. DOT Good morning, The district court issued a preliminary injunction in California v. U.S. DOT, enjoining the defendants from imposing the immigration enforcement conditions on the States that sued and their local governments. The decision is fairly short given the time frame (some of the grants required certification by today). Here is the order (again only as to the States and their governmental subdivisions): 1. Defendants are prohibited from implementing or enforcing the Immigration Enforcement Condition as set forth in the Duffy Directive. 2. Defendants are prohibited from withholding or terminating federal funding based on the Immigration Enforcement Condition as set forth in the Duffy Directive absent specific statutory authorization. 3. Defendants are prohibited from taking adverse action against any state entity or local jurisdiction, including barring it from receiving or making it ineligible for federal funding, based on the Immigration Enforcement Condition, absent specific statutory authorization. 4. The Court forbids and enjoins any attempt to implement the Immigration Enforcement Condition, and any actions by the Defendants to implement or enforce the Immigration Enforcement Condition. You can read the decision here: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.59601/gov.uscourts.rid.59601.57.0_1.pdf<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__storage.courtlistener.com_recap_gov.uscourts.rid.59601_gov.uscourts.rid.59601.57.0-5F1.pdf&d=DwMFAg&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=jblVzryv37xz6dGHTIBd0omyr7IZ_ghleJygNWPo2JE&m=RrqoTDvqFC8gZ5cjM5WLykzEyk02P-Cd940KlO0UQhRq98WNkirZoi3Nbu4hXF0E&s=t-melPwBbpN9ilCHN8S71FXghQ6jTiy_TZ8zS4gHGcU&e=>. Thanks, Amanda [logo]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__imla.org_&d=DwMFAg&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=jblVzryv37xz6dGHTIBd0omyr7IZ_ghleJygNWPo2JE&m=RrqoTDvqFC8gZ5cjM5WLykzEyk02P-Cd940KlO0UQhRq98WNkirZoi3Nbu4hXF0E&s=BaQ-fvgV4YEbgnWTO4VPvpx3V_phq8nxSu4lROeGPt0&e=> [facebook icon]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.facebook.com_InternationalMunicipalLawyersAssociation_&d=DwMFAg&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=jblVzryv37xz6dGHTIBd0omyr7IZ_ghleJygNWPo2JE&m=RrqoTDvqFC8gZ5cjM5WLykzEyk02P-Cd940KlO0UQhRq98WNkirZoi3Nbu4hXF0E&s=Y3GaGO1yeYTP4kujKb3z9aI6a3AXRtmUh9cb1upW3fA&e=>[twitter icon]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_imlalegal&d=DwMFAg&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=jblVzryv37xz6dGHTIBd0omyr7IZ_ghleJygNWPo2JE&m=RrqoTDvqFC8gZ5cjM5WLykzEyk02P-Cd940KlO0UQhRq98WNkirZoi3Nbu4hXF0E&s=HxXs53XDInT-tljI2BxxGD5Yygm7DqE8XdiyQK41Fxs&e=>[linkedin icon]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.linkedin.com_company_international-2Dmunicipal-2Dlawyers-2Dassociation-2Dinc._&d=DwMFAg&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=jblVzryv37xz6dGHTIBd0omyr7IZ_ghleJygNWPo2JE&m=RrqoTDvqFC8gZ5cjM5WLykzEyk02P-Cd940KlO0UQhRq98WNkirZoi3Nbu4hXF0E&s=8NmrH3YNnxzcGOx5uLJeBq247e_Lbg1KD8ClIH3YHtU&e=> Amanda Karras (she/her) Executive Director / General Counsel International Municipal Lawyers Association P: (202) 466-5424 x7116 D: (202) 742-1018 51 Monroe St. Suite 404 Rockville, MD, 20850 Plan Ahead! See IMLA's upcoming events<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__imla.org_events_&d=DwMFAg&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=jblVzryv37xz6dGHTIBd0omyr7IZ_ghleJygNWPo2JE&m=RrqoTDvqFC8gZ5cjM5WLykzEyk02P-Cd940KlO0UQhRq98WNkirZoi3Nbu4hXF0E&s=vEZ0zR629DrIE61znjh5cL0xPy9ATo1F168QYZyxiN4&e=>, calls and programming.