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IMLA Immigration Working Group

Amanda Karras

Sat, Jul 26, 2025 12:24 AM

Dear IMLA Immigration Working Group:

The district court in United States v. Illinois dismissed the federal government's Supremacy Clause claims brought against Chicago, Cook County, and Illinois related to their sanctuary policies. The dismissal was without prejudice, and I will send around some analysis of the decision on Monday, but wanted to forward it to you now.

Thanks,
Amanda

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Amanda Karras (she/her)
Executive Director / General Counsel
International Municipal Lawyers Association
P: (202) 466-5424 x7116
D: (202) 742-1018
51 Monroe St. Suite 404 Rockville, MD, 20850
Plan Ahead! See IMLA's upcoming eventshttps://imla.org/events/, calls and programming.

Dear IMLA Immigration Working Group: The district court in United States v. Illinois dismissed the federal government's Supremacy Clause claims brought against Chicago, Cook County, and Illinois related to their sanctuary policies. The dismissal was without prejudice, and I will send around some analysis of the decision on Monday, but wanted to forward it to you now. Thanks, Amanda [logo]<https://imla.org/> [facebook icon]<https://www.facebook.com/InternationalMunicipalLawyersAssociation/>[twitter icon]<https://twitter.com/imlalegal>[linkedin icon]<https://www.linkedin.com/company/international-municipal-lawyers-association-inc./> Amanda Karras (she/her) Executive Director / General Counsel International Municipal Lawyers Association P: (202) 466-5424 x7116 D: (202) 742-1018 51 Monroe St. Suite 404 Rockville, MD, 20850 Plan Ahead! See IMLA's upcoming events<https://imla.org/events/>, calls and programming.

Amanda Karras

Mon, Jul 28, 2025 7:37 PM

Dear IMLA Immigration Working Group:

As I mentioned on Friday, the district court dismissed the federal government's Supremacy Clause claims against Chicago, Cook County, and Illinois related to their sanctuary policies. I have summarized the decision below and attached the opinion here.

The court explains that generally, all three entities prohibit state and local government support of civil immigration activities. The court points out that the policies largely mirror each other but Chicago's Welcoming City Ordinance("WCO") prohibits requesting, maintaining, or sharing "the citizenship or immigration status of nay person", while Illinois and Cook County's policies prohibit sharing release dates and/or incarceration status and contact information. The policies also prohibit law enforcement from complying with civil detainers, but allow officers to respond to inquiries / requests accompanied by a criminal warrant. The federal government argues these policies violate the Supremacy Clause by interfering with the federal government's ability to enforce federal immigration law and by discriminating against the United States.

In addition to suing the entities, the federal government also sued individuals such as the Board President of Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County. The court dismissed these claims as the United States had conceded that an injunction against the County would redress its injuries. And similarly, as to Chicago's Mayor and CPD Superintendent, the court found the United States lacked standing to sue because the federal government failed to demonstrate any alleged injuries traceable to these individuals. The claims as to the individuals were therefore dismissed.

After dismissing the individual plaintiffs, the court analyzes the remaining claims against the entities and provides a good bit of background on the Supremacy Clause, anti-commandeering, preemption, and our dual system of sovereignty and the interplay between these doctrines. As to anti-commandeering, the court explains:

Centered on the principle of voluntariness, the anticommandeering doctrine holds that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." New York, 505 U.S. at 188. Nor can it conscript state or local officers directly, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), or coerce States to action through improper influence, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 578. This holds true no matter how strong the federal interest at play. New York, 505 U.S. at 178. Therefore, while Congress has many enumerated powers, and may even overtake state law, it may not wield States as federal tools. In this way, anticommandeering is a bulwark against abuse of government power. It also promotes political accountability by enabling voters to distinguish which sovereign is responsible for a specific policy, and "prevents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States." Murphy, 584 U.S. at 473-74.

The court then turns to the federal government's express preemption claims, where it argues that 1373 and 1644 expressly preempt the relevant sanctuary laws/policies. The court begins by analyzing the policies that restrict government officials from "providing information about a criminally detained individual's contact information, custody status, and/or release date to immigration authorities." The court explains that "at first blush" 1373 "doesn't speak to the information covered by the Sanctuary Policies" because 1373 restricts prohibitions on sharing information "regarding" an individual's "citizenship or immigration status." The United States argued that "regarding" encompasses other subjects including contact information, custody status, and release dates. The court rejected the United States' argument, calling it a "capacious reading" of the statute, reasoning its conclusion is supported by the text, structure, and history of 1373. The court explained: "If such attenuated information fell within the scope of information 'regarding' citizenship or immigration status, it's difficult to see where it would end."

The analysis is different for Section 2-173-030(a)(1) of the WCO, which the court notes restricts sharing "the precise kind of information that § 1373 prohibits restrictions on: information pertaining to the 'citizenship or immigration status' of a person." Chicago argued the savings clause in the WCO applies, which provides "unless required to do so by statute." The court rejected that argument because 1373 does not require information sharing, it prohibits restrictions on it. The court therefore concluded that the provision would have been expressly preempted by 1373, but for the anticommandeering doctrine. The court concluded that Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 584 U.S. 453, 470 (2018) made it clear that "for a federal statute to preempt state law it must 'be best read as one that regulates private actors' rather than governmental officials." 1373, according to the court, does not regulate private actors "in language or effect" and is therefore not a preemptive statute. In other words, "there is no way to read 1373 as regulating anyone other than States and their political subdivisions. This not only nullifies § 1373 as a preemption provision but also evokes significant anticommandeering concerns." While the court does not decide the constitutionality of 1373 (because it was not necessary to do so), it noted it "is impossible to ignore the state sovereignty concerns that would arise if § 1373 overtook state and local law."

Next, the court rejected the federal government's conflict preemption arguments (where it argued for example that prohibiting compliance with detainer requests / administrative warrants stands as an obstacle to Congress' intent that the removal process be an expedited one). The court reasoned that detainers are "requests, not requirements" and "[d]eclining an option offered by a federal statute cannot create a conflict for preemption purposes." Similarly, "[b]ecause any collaboration under the INA is permissive, not mandatory, there is no hook for the United States's preemption argument with respect to maintaining or sharing information about people in custody (including maintaining detainer requests in individuals' criminal case files) and providing access to individuals in detention for state and local offenses to facilitate ICE interviews."

Finally, the court rejected the United States' intergovernmental immunity claims as the policies were not discriminating against the federal government. The United States failed to identify a comparator, which ends the inquiry. Nor do any of the policies directly regulate the federal government. Moreover, the court notes that finding the policies constitute discrimination or impermissible regulation of the federal government "would provide an end-run around the Tenth Amendment" and would "allow the federal government to commandeer the States under the guise of intergovernmental immunity..."

[logo]https://imla.org/

From: Amanda Karras
Sent: Friday, July 25, 2025 8:25 PM
Cc: immigration@lists.imla.org
Subject: IMLA Immigration Working Group

Dear IMLA Immigration Working Group:

Thanks,
Amanda

[logo]https://imla.org/

Dear IMLA Immigration Working Group: As I mentioned on Friday, the district court dismissed the federal government's Supremacy Clause claims against Chicago, Cook County, and Illinois related to their sanctuary policies. I have summarized the decision below and attached the opinion here. The court explains that generally, all three entities prohibit state and local government support of civil immigration activities. The court points out that the policies largely mirror each other but Chicago's Welcoming City Ordinance("WCO") prohibits requesting, maintaining, or sharing "the citizenship or immigration status of nay person", while Illinois and Cook County's policies prohibit sharing release dates and/or incarceration status and contact information. The policies also prohibit law enforcement from complying with civil detainers, but allow officers to respond to inquiries / requests accompanied by a criminal warrant. The federal government argues these policies violate the Supremacy Clause by interfering with the federal government's ability to enforce federal immigration law and by discriminating against the United States. In addition to suing the entities, the federal government also sued individuals such as the Board President of Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County. The court dismissed these claims as the United States had conceded that an injunction against the County would redress its injuries. And similarly, as to Chicago's Mayor and CPD Superintendent, the court found the United States lacked standing to sue because the federal government failed to demonstrate any alleged injuries traceable to these individuals. The claims as to the individuals were therefore dismissed. After dismissing the individual plaintiffs, the court analyzes the remaining claims against the entities and provides a good bit of background on the Supremacy Clause, anti-commandeering, preemption, and our dual system of sovereignty and the interplay between these doctrines. As to anti-commandeering, the court explains: Centered on the principle of voluntariness, the anticommandeering doctrine holds that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." New York, 505 U.S. at 188. Nor can it conscript state or local officers directly, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), or coerce States to action through improper influence, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 578. This holds true no matter how strong the federal interest at play. New York, 505 U.S. at 178. Therefore, while Congress has many enumerated powers, and may even overtake state law, it may not wield States as federal tools. In this way, anticommandeering is a bulwark against abuse of government power. It also promotes political accountability by enabling voters to distinguish which sovereign is responsible for a specific policy, and "prevents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States." Murphy, 584 U.S. at 473-74. The court then turns to the federal government's express preemption claims, where it argues that 1373 and 1644 expressly preempt the relevant sanctuary laws/policies. The court begins by analyzing the policies that restrict government officials from "providing information about a criminally detained individual's contact information, custody status, and/or release date to immigration authorities." The court explains that "at first blush" 1373 "doesn't speak to the information covered by the Sanctuary Policies" because 1373 restricts prohibitions on sharing information "regarding" an individual's "citizenship or immigration status." The United States argued that "regarding" encompasses other subjects including contact information, custody status, and release dates. The court rejected the United States' argument, calling it a "capacious reading" of the statute, reasoning its conclusion is supported by the text, structure, and history of 1373. The court explained: "If such attenuated information fell within the scope of information 'regarding' citizenship or immigration status, it's difficult to see where it would end." The analysis is different for Section 2-173-030(a)(1) of the WCO, which the court notes restricts sharing "the precise kind of information that § 1373 prohibits restrictions on: information pertaining to the 'citizenship or immigration status' of a person." Chicago argued the savings clause in the WCO applies, which provides "unless required to do so by statute." The court rejected that argument because 1373 does not require information sharing, it prohibits restrictions on it. The court therefore concluded that the provision would have been expressly preempted by 1373, but for the anticommandeering doctrine. The court concluded that Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 584 U.S. 453, 470 (2018) made it clear that "for a federal statute to preempt state law it must 'be best read as one that regulates private actors' rather than governmental officials." 1373, according to the court, does not regulate private actors "in language or effect" and is therefore not a preemptive statute. In other words, "there is no way to read 1373 as regulating anyone other than States and their political subdivisions. This not only nullifies § 1373 as a preemption provision but also evokes significant anticommandeering concerns." While the court does not decide the constitutionality of 1373 (because it was not necessary to do so), it noted it "is impossible to ignore the state sovereignty concerns that would arise if § 1373 overtook state and local law." Next, the court rejected the federal government's conflict preemption arguments (where it argued for example that prohibiting compliance with detainer requests / administrative warrants stands as an obstacle to Congress' intent that the removal process be an expedited one). The court reasoned that detainers are "requests, not requirements" and "[d]eclining an option offered by a federal statute cannot create a conflict for preemption purposes." Similarly, "[b]ecause any collaboration under the INA is permissive, not mandatory, there is no hook for the United States's preemption argument with respect to maintaining or sharing information about people in custody (including maintaining detainer requests in individuals' criminal case files) and providing access to individuals in detention for state and local offenses to facilitate ICE interviews." Finally, the court rejected the United States' intergovernmental immunity claims as the policies were not discriminating against the federal government. The United States failed to identify a comparator, which ends the inquiry. Nor do any of the policies directly regulate the federal government. Moreover, the court notes that finding the policies constitute discrimination or impermissible regulation of the federal government "would provide an end-run around the Tenth Amendment" and would "allow the federal government to commandeer the States under the guise of intergovernmental immunity..." [logo]<https://imla.org/> [facebook icon]<https://www.facebook.com/InternationalMunicipalLawyersAssociation/>[twitter icon]<https://twitter.com/imlalegal>[linkedin icon]<https://www.linkedin.com/company/international-municipal-lawyers-association-inc./> Amanda Karras (she/her) Executive Director / General Counsel International Municipal Lawyers Association P: (202) 466-5424 x7116 D: (202) 742-1018 51 Monroe St. Suite 404 Rockville, MD, 20850 Plan Ahead! See IMLA's upcoming events<https://imla.org/events/>, calls and programming. From: Amanda Karras Sent: Friday, July 25, 2025 8:25 PM Cc: immigration@lists.imla.org Subject: IMLA Immigration Working Group Dear IMLA Immigration Working Group: The district court in United States v. Illinois dismissed the federal government's Supremacy Clause claims brought against Chicago, Cook County, and Illinois related to their sanctuary policies. The dismissal was without prejudice, and I will send around some analysis of the decision on Monday, but wanted to forward it to you now. Thanks, Amanda [logo]<https://imla.org/> [facebook icon]<https://www.facebook.com/InternationalMunicipalLawyersAssociation/>[twitter icon]<https://twitter.com/imlalegal>[linkedin icon]<https://www.linkedin.com/company/international-municipal-lawyers-association-inc./> Amanda Karras (she/her) Executive Director / General Counsel International Municipal Lawyers Association P: (202) 466-5424 x7116 D: (202) 742-1018 51 Monroe St. Suite 404 Rockville, MD, 20850 Plan Ahead! See IMLA's upcoming events<https://imla.org/events/>, calls and programming.