Good afternoon: I have a couple of immigration / federal funding updates. 1. Immigration / Funding. Here is a link to the federal government's response to the court's order in San Francisco v. Trump. https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.444175/gov.uscourts.cand.444175.166.0.pdf. The response primarily focuses on the Court's order which required the defendants to demonstrate that the conditions in the HUD CoC grant agreements were substantively related to the CoC grants. 1. Immigration. The federal government filed its opposition to the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and its memorandum in support of its cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings in United States v. Rochester. The filing relies heavily on the case law in the Second Circuit that is favorable to the federal government on 8 USC 1373, including the New York v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 951 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020) (which was the only circuit court to side with the federal government during the first Trump administration to conclude that the imposition of the immigration conditions on the Byrne Jag grant did not exceed the Attorney General's authority) as well as City of New York v. United States, 170 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (which upholds the constitutionality of 8 USC 1373) . The federal government also takes the position (which it has done previously) that the term "information regarding citizenship or immigration status" is broad and encompasses other information beyond immigration status such as information contained on a travel or identification document like where they are from, their address, and dates of entry into the US. You can review the filing here: (https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nywd.155429/gov.uscourts.nywd.155429.33.0.pdf 1. Immigration. In Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem, the case in which LA and other cities/counties in California sought to intervene that I emailed about on Friday, the court granted the plaintiffs' application for a TRO on 7/11. The plaintiffs brought this as a class action lawsuit. The court describes the lawsuit as being based on "'roving patrols' indiscriminately rounding up numerous individuals without reasonable suspicion and, having done so, denying these individuals access to lawyers who could help them navigate the legal process they found themselves in." The plaintiffs argue, and the court credits these arguments, that the federal government lacked reasonable suspicion when it has arrested the plaintiffs and instead that it was detaining them based on factors like race and speaking English with an accent. The court notes that the federal government agrees that if these actions were true, they would violate the Fourth Amendment (the roving patrols) and Fifth Amendment (denying access to lawyers). The federal government argued this was not happening, which the court states is contrary to a "mountain of evidence." For example, the court finds the defendants do not present evidence controverting the declarations that legal organizations' members were unable to gain access to their clients in the detention facility, but rather, the defendants simply try to minimize the impact of those facts. In the face of this conclusion, the court grants the plaintiffs' TRO request. In terms of the relief, the court orders that the defendants shall provide access to the particular building where the individuals are being detained for legal visitation by current and prospective attorneys, which the court orders, shall be permitted seven days a week for a minimum of eight hours per day on business days and four hours per day on weekends and holidays. The defendants are also ordered to provide access to confidential telephone calls with attorneys. The court also enjoins the defendants from conducting "detentive stops" in the court's district "unless the agent has reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law." In its order, the court states the defendants may not solely rely on the below factors (alone or in combination) to form reasonable suspicion for a detentive stop, except as permitted by law: "apparent race or ethnicity; speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent; Presence at a particular location (e.g., bus stop, car wash, tow yard, day laborer pick up site, agricultural site, etc.); or the type of work one does." The court orders the defendants to maintain and provide documentation of these tops including the factors supporting reasonable suspicion and orders the defendants to develop guidance concerning how agents should determine whether reasonable suspicion exists. The court analyzes the scope of the injunction necessary to prevent the federal government from detaining individuals absent reasonable suspicion. The court finds that "to provide complete relief to the named Stop/Arrest Plaintiffs, even without considering the unnamed class members and the propriety of certifying a class - this Court must enjoin the conduct of all law enforcement engaged in immigration enforcement throughout the District. Particularly given how these enforcement actions appear to have been conducted, it would be a fantasy to expect that law enforcement could and would inquire whether a given individual was among the named Stop / Arrest Plaintiffs or the (putative) class before proceeding with a seizure." You can review the order here: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.975351/gov.uscourts.cacd.975351.87.0_2.pdf [logo]<https://imla.org/> [facebook icon]<https://www.facebook.com/InternationalMunicipalLawyersAssociation/>[twitter icon]<https://twitter.com/imlalegal>[linkedin icon]<https://www.linkedin.com/company/international-municipal-lawyers-association-inc./> Amanda Karras (she/her) Executive Director / General Counsel International Municipal Lawyers Association P: (202) 466-5424 x7116 D: (202) 742-1018 51 Monroe St. Suite 404 Rockville, MD, 20850 Plan Ahead! See IMLA's upcoming events<https://imla.org/events/>, calls and programming.