In Woods, et al. v. Willis, et al, the 6th Circuit today reversed an attorney's fee award in a fair housing act case. Some of the discussion not repeated below involved the entitlement to attorney fees when the success in the matter is limited. Below is a discussion of what a court should be required to do in an attorney's fee petition and the requirements placed on the person seeking attorney's fees. Don't forget that our IMLA Section 1983 program is scheduled for April and that cyber Monday is the last day for our bundled discount for the 1983 program and our annual conference in San Diego (dates of both below my signature). This is a great opportunity to attend two really special events for our best price. As to the case, I guess the cynic in me wonders who should bear the cost of the attorneys fees on the appeal- from the decision: Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the party requesting attorneys' fees "bears the burden of proof on the number of hours expended." Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). "We have explained that '[in] obtaining the number of hours expended on the case, the district court must conclude that the party seeking the award has sufficiently documented its claim.'" Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 552 (quoting United Slate, Local 307 v. G & M Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 732 F.2d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 1984)). The district court's own statements indicate that it did not require Fuller to meet this burden. The district court suggested that it "could find . . . without fear or risk of reversal" that Fuller's attorneys had not carried their initial burden of proof in establishing the number of hours reasonably spent working on the successful claim. Woods, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 902. The court stated that "in all . . . material respects," the revised fee petition "fails to establish the reasonableness of the hours expended." Id. at 904. Nevertheless, the court awarded attorneys' fees. We agree with Willis that, in doing so, the court improperly applied the law and therefore abused its discretion. B. There is another problem with the district court's award. "When making a determination of a reasonable attorney fee, a district court begins by determining 'the fee applicant's "lodestar," which is the proven number of hours reasonably expended on the case by an attorney, multiplied by his court-ascertained reasonable hourly rate.'" Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 821 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000)). Here, the court determined that an hourly rate of $220 was reasonable for the attorneys from ABLE and a rate of $400 per hour was reasonable for the attorneys from Relman Dane; neither party contests these determinations on appeal. What is in dispute is the court's determination of the proven number of hours reasonably spent by Fuller's attorneys. Once the party requesting fees carries its initial burden of proof on the number of hours expended, the district court should review the hours claimed by the attorneys and then "should state with some particularity which of the claimed hours the court is rejecting, which it is accepting, and why." Sierra Club v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 504 F.3d 634, 645 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1193 (6th Cir. 1997)). Failure to do so "requires us to remand the case for further consideration." Id. (citation omitted). Here, the court failed to go through the attorneys' application in detail and state with some particularity which hours it was accepting and rejecting. Instead, the court listed eight different categories of work-items such as "Initial legal research and preparation of complaint" and "Preparation for and conducting discovery"-and, for each one, stated, in conclusory fashion, the number of hours that the court believed "a reasonable, efficient, and cost-conscious attorney would have expended." Woods, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 903. Fuller complains that the court "cast aside the extensive billing records" and "produced an award unmoored from" the analytical process required under circuit precedent. R. at 38, Fourth Br. 9. We agree and therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion. Charles W. Thompson, Jr. Executive Director and General Counsel International Municipal Lawyers Association, Inc. 7910 Woodmont Ave., Suite 1440 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 202-466-5424 x7110 Direct: 202-742-1016 Cell: 240-876-6790 Plan ahead: IMLA's Annual Seminar April 15-18, 2016 - Omni Shoreham, Washington D.C. IMLA's Annual Conference September 28 - October 2, 2016 - San Diego